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In a paper published elsewhere in this issue ('The Impossibility of  Defining 
"Omnipotence" '), Richard R. La Croix argues that it is impossible to produce 
a satisfactory general definition of omnipotence (i.e., one which generalizes 
universally over persons). And he suggests that theologians, and people with 
similar interests, should turn their attention away from this project and 
toward that of  formulating an analysis of  God is omnipotent. In this paper I 
will discuss La Croix's argument for the impossibility thesis, but I will have 
nothing at all to say about his latter suggestion. 
The general strategy of La Croix's argument seems to me to go like this. 
He sets out a general schema for definitions of omnipotence, and a set of 
four conditions which any defmition must satisfy if it is not to lead to logical 
absurdities, be theologically irrelevant, or be vacuous. He then argues that 
any definition which satisfies the first two conditions must fail to satisfy 
either the third or the fourth condition. And this stage of the argument is car- 
ried forward by considering a type of definition which satisfies conditions 1 
and 2, but not 3, and then asking how it might be amended to remedy this 
defect. At that point La Croix argues that the only possible amendments 
which will bring it into conformity with condition 3 must also guarantee that 
it fails to satisfy condition 4. And that, of course, yields the impossibility 
thesis. (In this paper I will give a further account of only those parts of  
a Croix's argument which I intend to criticize in some detail. Readers are urged 
to refer to La Croix's own article for a full statement of his argument.) 
I believe that La Croix's argument is inconclusive. It has two related weak 
points. The first is that his general schema for definitions of  'omnipotence' is 
9 defective. The second is that he fails to show that his way of remedying the 
initial defect in his sample definition (or type of definition) is the only 
possible way. And so, even if his own amended attempt falls prey to the ob- 
jections which he urges, it does not show that all such attempts must similarly 
fail. 
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I hope to argue these points constructively, by producing a definition of 
'omnipotence' which, it seems to me, avoids all of La Croix's difficulties. 
I am not sure that this defmition is completely satisfactory, though I think 
it has a pretty good chance of being so. At the very least, however, it should 
reassure us that La Croix has not proved this project to be impossible. 
Well, to begin. First I must say a little about what I have called La Croix's 
general schema for definitions of 'omnipotence': He says "Presumably any 
definition, D, of omnipotence will quantify over individuals and states of 
affairs... D will make a statement to the effect that with respect to any in- 
dividual x and any state of affairs s, the sentence 'x is omnipotent' equals by 
definition or is logically equivalent to the sentence 'if s satisfies a certain set 
of conditions C then x is able to bring about s' ... This presumably describes 
the general structure and content minimally necessary to any definition, D, 
of omnipotence." And in a footnote La Croix allows that a definition may 
quantify over actions rather than states of affairs. 
I think that this schema is not correct as it stands. It requires emendation, 
and the change turns out to be rather important. A satisfactory definition of 
omnipotence will not quantify over states of affairs (or actions), but rather 
either over propositions or else over sets of possible states of affairs (or sets of 
possible actions). Let me explain my reason for that. 
Let us imagine a person who sets out to test the alleged omnipotence of 
God in a crudely empirical way. He issues various challenges to God, and 
waits to see how God responds. So one day he shouts, "Can you bring it 
about that China is invaded by a Swiss army?" And suppose that God replies, 
"Yes, I can," And, sure enough, the next day a Swiss army crosses the 
Chinese border from the north. Now, assuming at least that the invasion was 
not a lucky coincidence but was really brought about by God, it certainly 
looks as though God would have met the challenge. So far, at least, the chal- 
lenger has failed to discover that God lacks omnipotence. And God has ap- 
parently met this challenge by bringing about a certain state of affairs. But 
has He brought about the state of  affairs which was identified, or referred to, 
in the challenge? I think not, for the following reason. 
God, we are supposing, brought about an invasion of China from the 
north. But He would have met the challenge equally well if He had brought a 
Swiss army into China from the south. China's being invaded from the south, 
however, does not seem to be the same state of affairs as China's being in- 
vaded from the north. If  that is so, however, then they cannot both be the 
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state of  affairs referred to in the challenge. But there seems to be no reason 
to pick out one of  these rather than the other as being that state of  affairs. 
So it seems likely that  neither of  these states of  affairs, whose actuality would 
satisfy the challenge, is the state of  affairs referred to in the challenge. 
Once we see this, it may be obvious to us that the original challenge does 
not identify any state of  affairs at all, and that is why God's action does not 
bring about that state of  affairs. The heart of  the challenge is a proposition, 
China is invaded by a Swiss army, which may also be put as a nominalization, 
China's being invaded by a Swiss army. But this proposition would be 
rendered true by any one of a large number,  maybe an inf'mite number, of  
distinct possible states of  affairs. I f  the challenger refers to, or identifies, any 
states of  affairs at all, then he refers to this whole set of  possible states of  
affairs. And God will meet that challenge successfully if He brings into ac- 
tuality any one (not all) of  that set of  possible states of  affairs, any state of  
affairs which would render true the proposition embedded in the challenge. 
Now, I think that we can construe a definition of  omnipotence as general- 
izing over challenges of  this sort, as saying that  any person is omnipotent  if  
and only if he is able to meet every challenge - or, more accurately, if  he is 
able to meet every challenge which satisfies certain conditions of  internal 
coherence, etc. To put this somewhat more formally, let us say that a state 
of  affairs, S, satisfies a proposition, p,  if  and only i f p  could not fail to be true 
if S were actually to obtain. Then I will say that a definition of  omnipotence 
will quantify universally over persons and over propositions, and the defini- 
tion will say that an agent is omnipotent  if  and only if for any proposition 
which meets a certain condition the agent can bring about some state of  af- 
fairs which satisfies that proposition. 
This schema will yield an actual definition if we specify the conditions to 
be placed on the propositions over which it quantifies. What are the parts o f  
that condition? 
One widely recognized condition, which is roughly equivalent to La Croix's 
first condition is the following: 
(C1) There is some possible state of  affairs which would satisfy p, and 
such that it is not a necessary truth that no agent has brought 
it about that this state of  affairs obtains. 
This condition rules out propositions which are necessarily unsatisfiable by the 
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action of an agent. As La Croix points out, it is widely (though not universal- 
ly) recognized among philosophers who have written about omnipotence that 
this notion does not require the power to bring about logical absurdities. So, 
for example, if there are some properties which are essential to Charlemagne 
and which are of such a sort that it is not logically possible that Charlemagne 
should have been a swordfish, then it does no damage to the omnipotence of 
God to recognize that God could not have created Charlemagne as a sword- 
fish (though He could, presumably, have created a swordfish instead of 
Charlemagne). 
Well, (C1) is the first restriction to be incorporated into our definition. Is it 
sufficient? La Croix would perhaps argue that it is not. For he holds that 
"there is a kind of state of affairs whose description is not self-contradictory 
and which it is logically possible for some agent or other to bring about but 
which it is logically im~0ossible for some particular agent to bring about. So, 
for example, a state of affairs not brought about by an omnipotent being is 
a state of affairs whose description is not self-contradictory and which it is 
logically impossible for an omnipotent being to bring about." La Croix for- 
mulates his second condition to rule out such cases. Perhaps I should have 
some analogue of that condition. Or should I? 
In the first place, we might notice something odd about the way in which 
La Croix's argument goes at this point. He claims that a state of affairs not 
brought about by an omnipotent being is one which it is not possible for an 
omnipotent being to bring about. Is there any reason to believe that to be 
true? I doubt it. Suppose that my neighbor sets fire to his house, and I have 
nothing to do with it. A certain state of affairs will then obtain, a state of af- 
fairs which may be reported in the newspaper the next day as the burning 
down of my neighbor's house. And one property of this state of affairs will 
be that it was brought about by my neighbor and not by me. But suppose 
someone wonders whether I couM have brought about that state of affairs, 
whether I had the power to do it. And why should not the answer to that 
question be yes? I am as handy with matches as is my neighbor. I, too, have 
the power to set fire to his house. Of course, if I had been the one to set fire 
to his house then the resulting state of affairs would have had a property 
which (on our initial supposition) it does not actually have. But so what? If  I 
had been a lawyer I would have had a property which, as it happens, I do not 
actually have. I does not follow that I could not have been a lawyer, that I 
had no power to become a lawyer. So from the fact that if I, rather than 
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someone else, had actualized a certain state of  affairs it would have had a 
property which it does not actually have it does not follow that I had no 
power to actualize it. 
La Croix's argument seems to involve a confusion at this point. We can 
often refer to a thing satisfactorily enough be way of  some non-essential 
property of  that thing. So we may refer to a certain lady, quite accurately, 
as "the tallest lady in Des Moines". And we may then notice that the sen- 
tence, "The tallest lady in Des Moines is not  the tallest lady in Des Moines", 
could not possibly be true (given, of  course, the normal interpretation of  its 
parts). That it so, but it is nevertheless easily possible that the tallest lady 
in Des Moines should not be the tallest lady in Des Moines. She would cease 
to be the tallest lady in Des Moines, for example, if a taller than she should 
move there. And she might never have been the tallest lady in Des Moines 
if she had eaten less heartily when she was young. The property of  being the 
tallest lady in Des Moines is not  an essential property of  the person who has 
it, and so that very person might have failed to have that property. So also, 
it seems to me, the property of  being brought about by a being who is not 
omnipotent is probably not  an essential property of  any state of  affairs which 
happens to have it. And if that is so then there is no reason to believe that an 
omnipotent being would not have the power to bring about such states o f  
affairs. 
This observation may be sufficient to solve the problem which troubles 
La Croix at this point. But there is also a second, and more powerful, reason 
for thinking that a satisfactory definition need not contain any analogue of  
La Croix's second condition. And this reason would hold even if it should be 
the case that being brought about by such-and-such an agent (or kind of  
agent) were an essential property of  every state of  affairs. This reason, briefly, 
is that La Croix's problem here has no application to definitions which follow, 
my proposed schema. My definition does not require that an omnipotent 
being be able to actualize all states of  affairs of  a certain type, but rather that 
for all propositions of  a certain type such a being can actualize some state of  
affairs which satisfies them. So the discovery o f  some state of  affairs which 
the candidate cannot actualize may not, of  itself, damage his claim to om- 
nipotence. That will depend upon whether there is some permissible proposi- 
tion such that this state of  affairs is the only one which will satisfy it. And it 
is not  at all clear that there is any such proposition. 
Consider, for example, the following: 
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(1) Hidden Valley is flooded. 
Can God, if He is omnipotent, bring about some state of affairs which 
satisfies (1)? Well, yes, I suppose so. Maybe, for example, He can cause a 
small avalanche which will dam Hidden Valley Creek, thus causing some 
flooding in the valley. So far, so good. 
At this point, however, La Croix would no doubt insist that he is not con- 
cerned with propositions such as (1), but rather with some which include a 
proposition similar to (1) plus some specification of the agent who brings 
about the state of affairs satisfying the included proposition. So we get 
(2) A non-omnipotent being brings it about that Hidden Valley is 
flooded. 
And La Croix apparently believes that it is not possible for an omnipotent 
being to bring about a state of affairs which satisfies (2). Presumably it is the 
reference, within (2), to a non-omnipotent being which leads him to the 
belief. It seems to me, however, that this is a mistake. (2) says, in effect, that 
some non-omnipotent being brings about some state of affairs which satisfies 
(1). It does not say anything, however, about what being (if any) brings 
about the state of affairs which satisfies (2). And, so far as I can see, it is 
quite possible that God, if He is omnipotent, may bring about a state of af- 
fairs which satisifles (2). He may, for example, cause a beaver to build a dam 
across Hidden Valley Creek. The beaver, presumably, is not omnipotent. 
Hence it will be the case that a non-omnipotent being, the beaver, has 
brought about the flooding of Hidden Valley. And that more inclusive state 
of affairs will have been brought about by God. Furthermore, not only could 
this be done by God, but it could be done by any agent who was omnipotent. 
So (2) is apparently not the proposition which we were seeking. 
Another interesting candidate is 
(3) Some non-omnipotent being freely (by free will) brings it about 
that Hidden Valley is flooded. 
I think that some state of affairs might obtain which would satisfy (3). Some 
human being, for example, might dam IJIidden Valley Creek, and if he did so 
(and did it freely) then (3) would be satisfied. Could God bring about some 
state of affairs which satisfies (3)? 
I believe that God, regardless of whether He is omnipotent, could not 
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bring about any state of  affairs which satisfies (3). That is because I believe 
that if  someone freely does one thing rather than another then no one (or 
nothing) causes it to be the case, or brings it about, that  he does the one thing 
rather than the other. And so, it seems to me, neither God nor anyone else 
can bring it about that some person freely dams Hidden Valley Creek. That, 
however, is a difficult thesis, much disputed among philosophers. It would 
not be germane to our topic here to pursue it further. For (3) is innoccuous 
regardless of  how that thesis turns out. 
If, as some philosophers claim, free will is compatible with determinism, 
causation, etc., then there is no reason to think that God, if  He is omnipo- 
tent, cannot bring about a state of  affairs which satisfies (3). For He can 
simply cause some human being to dam Hidden Valley Creek, etc. In this case, 
(3) will be handled just like (2). 
If, on the other hand, I should be right in thinking that free will is in- 
compatible with determinism, causation, etc., then we must take a different 
tack. The important  point to notice here is that, if  there is this incompatibility, 
then the agent himself is not the cause of  his doing the one thing rather than 
the other. He performs his own action, of  course, but he does not cause him- 
self to perform that action, nor bring it about that  he performs this action. 
Rather, on this view, his doing of  that action freely is not brought about a C 
all, either by  himself or by someone else. 
We need to use here a distinction similar to one which we used with 
reference to (1) and (2). A beaver, I said, might bring about a state of  affairs 
which satisfied (1). I f  he did so, then there would also obtain a state of  affairs 
which satisfies (2). We need not think, however, that this second state of  af- 
fairs must, like the first one, also be brought about by the beaver. No, it may 
be God (or some other agent), and not the beaver, who causes the beaver to 
build the dam, etc. Now, when we come to (3) we consider the possibility 
that, say, a human being may freely bring about the state of  affairs which 
satisfies (1). I f  he does so, then there will also obtain a state of  affairs which 
satisfies (3). But just as we need not suppose that  the beaver brings about the 
state of  affairs which satisfies (2), so here we need not  assume that the human 
being brings about the state of  affairs which satisfies (3). Indeed, the incom- 
patibility thesis requires that  such a state of  affairs be brought about by no 
one at all. In my  view, therefore, it is readily possible that there should 
obtain some states of  affairs - those which involve the free acts of  some agents 
- such that  it is not  possible that  they be brought about at all. (This does n o t  
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entail, incidentally, that such states of  affairs occur 'by chance', randomly, 
etc.) 
I f  all of  this is so, then God cannot satisfy a challenge which is couched in 
terms of  (3). That fact, however, will not damage His claim to omnipotence, 
as I define it, for (3) runs afoul o f  condition (C1). On the supposition we are 
here using it is a necessary truth that no agent can bring about any state of  af- 
fairs which would satisfy (3). And so the discovery that this or that agent can- 
not  do it has no bearing on whether such an agent is omnipotent.  
This brings me to the last case I want to consider here. Going back to our 
discussion of  (2), we may notice that while the beaver brings about the 
flooding of  Hidden Valley, there is also a sense in which God causes of  flood- 
ing (by causing the beaver to build a dam, etc.). And that may inspire us to 
construct 
(4) A non-omnipotent  being brings it about that Hidden Valley is 
flooded, and no omnipotent  being brings it about that Hidden 
Valley is flooded. 
Can God, If  He is omnipotent ,  bring it about that some state of  affairs satisfy- 
ing (4) obtains? 
I am inclined to think that no omnipotent  being can bring about any such 
state of  affairs. But what the significance of  that fact may be is not altogether 
clear. 
We should inquire first whether it is possible that (4) should be satisfied 
by any actual state of  affairs. Given my view of freedom, I believe that it is 
possible (and that many such states of  affairs actually obtain). But if the only 
states o f  affairs which can satisfy (4) involve some free action, then, given my 
view of  freedom, it is not possible that any agent should bring about a state 
of  affairs satisfying (4). In that case (4) could be handled just like (3). 
Is it possible at all that (4) should be satisfied by some state of  affairs 
which involves no free act of  a non-omnipotent  being? I f  it is a necessary 
truth that no such state of  affairs can obtain, then it is also a necessary truth 
that no such state of  affairs can be brought about by any agent. In that  case 
(4) will be ruled out by (C1), and will do no damage to any agent's claim to 
omnipotence. Well, is it a necessary truth? I am not sure that it is, but I also 
am not at all sure that it is not. It  has sometimes been claimed that it is neces- 
sarily true that God exists - that there is no possible world in which He does 
not exist. This view, though often challenged, is now being powerfully 
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defended. 1 I f  it should be true, and if it is also a necessary truth that God, if 
He exists, is omnipotent, then it seems likely that every state of affairs, 
except perhaps those which involve free will in some way, must be attributable 
in the end to an omnipotent being. And if that is so, then there cannot be a 
non-free-will satisfaction of (4). 
On the other hand, perhaps it is not a necessary truth that God exists (or 
that any other omnipotent being exists). Maybe it is true that there exists 
some being with a plausible claim to omnipotence, but only contingently 
true. Or maybe for some other reason it turns out to be possible for (4) to 
be satisfied by some non-free-will state of affairs. How would things stand 
then? Would the fact that no omnipotent being could meet a challenge which 
involved (4) show that no being could be omnipotent? 
It seems rather clear that it would not. For a failure to meet the challenge 
posed in (4) may be not be due to any lack of power, but rather to the fact 
that (4) simply decrees that it is not to be satisfied by certain types of agents. 
We wish, therefore, to exclude challenges based on propositions like (4) from 
the set of  legitimate challenges which are relevant to assessments of power 
and omnipotence. But if it is possible that some agent could bring about a 
state of affairs satisfying (4), then (4) is not ruled out by (C1). I therefore 
introduce another condition (which may, however, be redundant) 
(C2) If  p entails that some proposition, q, is satisfied, and if it is not a 
necessary truth that no agent can have brought about the satisfac- 
tion of q, then p does not exclude any agent, or class of agents, 
from among those which may have brought about the satisfaction 
ofq.  
And if (4) is not ruled out by (C1), then it will be excluded by (C2). 
These two conditions, I believe now, are sufficient. My proposed general 
definition of omnipotence, then would run as follows: 
For any agent, n, n is o m n i p o t e n t  IFF for any proposition, p, which meets 
conditions (C1) and (C2) below, n is able to bring about some state of affairs 
.which satisfies p.  The two conditions on p are: (C1) there is some possible 
state of affairs which would satisfy p, and such that it is not a necessary truth 
that no agent has brought it about that this state of  affairs obtains, and (C2) 
if p entails that some proposition, q, is satisfied, and if it is not a necessary 
truth that no agent can have brought about the satisfaction of q, then p does 
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not exclude any agent, or class of agent, from among those which may have 
brought about the satisfaction of q. 
This definition, I think, meets the difficulties posed in the main part of La 
Croix's paper. It does not require an omnipotent being to perform logical 
absurdities. It does not allow an omnipotence claim to be defeated by stipu- 
lations (as in (4)) which arbitrarily exclude certain agents. And it does not 
entail that some clearly impotent being (such as La Croix's Mr. McEar) is 
omnipotent. It remains only to consider La Croix's final difficulty, that as- 
sociated with the unfortunate case of Mr. McChin. 
La Croix introduces McChin in responding to an earlier suggestion of mine, 
a suggestion which in this paper is replaced by (C2). There is, nevertheless, still 
something of interest in McChin's sad case. As described by La Croix, McChin 
is almost omnipotent, having every requisite power except that of scratching 
chins. But it seems clear to La Croix that McChin is not omnipotent, and 
hence that any satisfactory definition must exclude him. 
Well, maybe so. Why does McChin fail of omnipotence? According to La 
Croix, "McChin is clearly not omnipotent since there are an indefinite num- 
ber of states of affairs that he is unable to bring about, namely, all those 
states of affairs in which McChin scratches chins." But this is not at all con- 
clusive. As I have already argued, the fact that we can identify some state of 
affairs which a certain being cannot bring about does not show that this 
being is not omnipotent. Such a being may still be perfectly well able to 
meet every legitimate challenge, and, if so, he will be omnipotent. And even 
apart from that argument for the moment, consider the case of a being for 
whom it is an essential property that he be disembodied. I.e., there is no pos- 
sible world in which that being exists and has a body. That being will not be 
able to scratch anyone's chin, since he has no finger with which to scratch it. 2 
He may, however, have the power to cause every chin to be scratched (pre- 
sumably McChin has this power), perhaps by creating the Amazonian Chin 
Scratcher, which goes about irresistibly scratching chins. Is it plausible to 
suppose that this being must be lacking in omnipotence simply because, 
though he can cause every chin to be scratched, he cannot himself scratch any 
. of them? That seems rather implausible. I do not, therefore, find it com- 
pletely obvious that Mr. McChin is not omnipotent. La Croix does not tell us 
whether the inability to scratch chins is an essential property of McChin - i.e., 
whether it is a necessary truth, or only a contingent truth, that if McChin 
exists he has this property. And that is crucial. 
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If  we were to formulate McChin's case in terms applicable to my definition 
we would have to find some proposition, presumably about McChin, chins, 
etc., and which satisfied conditions (C1) and (C2). I suppose the most 
plausible candidate, and the one which seems to be suggested by La Croix's 
discussion would be 
(5) Mr. McChin is scratching some chin. 
Now, La Croix seems to think that McChin cannot bring about any state 
of affairs which satisfies (5). Well, maybe not. But first, is it possible that 
some agent should bring about a state of affairs satisfying (5)? E.g., could 
some other agent (God, possibly?) strengthen McChin in the requisite way and 
then get him to scratch a chin or two? If  McChin's lamentable weakness is 
not one of his essential properties, then, I suppose, it is not a necessary truth 
that no agent can cure him of it. And if that is so, then proposition (5) meets 
the condition in my definition. We must then ask whether McChin himself 
could remedy this defect, etc. I f  so, then McChin can, after all, bring about 
some state of affairs which satisfies (5), and (5) will pose no barrier to his 
putative omnipotence. If, on the other hand, McChin cannot bring about the 
remedying of his own weakness, then he would seem to lack another power 
besides that of scratching chins. (That I cannot speak Russian is one thing; 
that I cannot learn Russian would seem to be another.) At any rate, if it is 
possible that someone should bring about the satisfaction of (5), but McChin 
cannot do so, then I agree with La Croix that McChin is not omnipotent. And 
my definition yields that result. 
If, on the other hand, no agent could possibly bring about the satisfaction 
of (5) (perhaps because the inability to scratch chins is an essential property 
of McChin) then McChin cannot do so. But an inability to do something of 
which it is necessarily true that no agent can do it, is not a barrier to om- 
nipotence. In this case, McChin may or may not fail of  omnipotence for 
some other reason. But his inability to scratch chins, and proposition (5), will 
have nothing to do with it. 
As I said at the beginning of this paper, the definition which I have pro- 
posed may prove defective in some way, and I will be interested to see if that 
happens, I believe, however, that it meets La Croix's problems, and refutes 
his claim to have proven that a general definition of omnipotence is impossible. 
The University of Michigan 
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N O T E S  
1 As by Alvin Plantinga in The Nature of  Necessity. 
2 The relevance of cases like this for the concept of omnipotence was first called to my 
attention by Dr. Joseph Runzo. 
